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Reynolds v. State: CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS
DURING INTERROGATION
MA Y BE ADMISSIBLE WHEN INSPIRED BY ALTRUISTIC INTENT.
In Reynolds' v. State, 327 Md. 494,
610 A.2d 782 (1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland refused to invalidate a criminal defendant's testimony
on the ground that his statements were
induced by a police officer's assurance
that they would result in the improved
mental health of his daughter. In so
ruling, the court of appeals reaffinned
its position that confessions elicited by
a defendant's sense of altruism do not
mandate suppression.
In 1989, Frederick William
Reynolds, Jr. (hereinafter "Reynolds")
was confronted by several members of
his family concerning his sexual abuse
of two of his daughters. Reynolds confessed and agreed to seek professional
help. He sought treatment at a counseling center, where he was informed that,
as a prerequisite to receiving treatment,
Maryland law required him to sign a
form authorizing the center to notify the
police of any evidence implicating him
as a child-abuser. Confused about his
options, Reynolds telephoned the Carroll
County State's Attorneys Office, where
he spoke with an Assistant State's Attorney who advised him to undergo
counseling. She also infonned him that
she could not provide him with further
advice because she was responsible for
prosecuting sexual abuse cases. Believing that he had no alternative to receiving treatment, Reynolds returned to the
center and signed the authorization fornl.
While receiving treatment, Reynolds
voluntarily agreed to meet with Maryland State Police Officer Corporal Richard E. Norman (hereinafter
"Norman"). At their first meeting,
Reynolds was informed that he was not
required to answer any questions he did
not want to answer and he would not, at
that time, be arrested. Despite such
assu rances, Reynolds requested Nonnan
to read him his Miranda rights. The
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interview continued and Reynolds freely
confessed to his previous criminal incestuous behavior.
After the meeting Nonnan continued his investigation by interviewing
Reynolds' daughters. Following a
lengthy discussion with Crystal, one of
Reynolds' daughters, Nonnan sought a
second interview with Reynolds, who
agreed to meet. During this meeting,
Reynolds was asked to corroborate statements Nornlan had recently received
from Crystal, one of Reynolds' daughters. After Norman suggested to
Reynolds that verifying Crystal's statements would ease his daughter's mental
anguish, Reynolds answered Nonnan 's
questions. Two days later, Norman returned to Reynolds' home and arrested
him on various charges of sexual offenses conunitted upon his daughters.
At trial, Reynolds made a motion to
suppress those incriminating statements
on the ground they were involuntary.
The Circuit Court for Carroll County
denied Reynolds' motion, finding
Reynolds guilty of various sexual offenses. On appeal, the court of special
appeals affirmed the circuit court, and
the Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted Reynolds' writ of certiorari.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, Reynolds challenged the
incriminating statements admitted at
trial on both due process and conunon
law grounds. ld at 503, 610 A.2d at
785. The court of appeals acknowledged that, in order to detennine whether
a confession was voluntary, the constitutional due process '''test is of the
totality of the circumstances. All of the
circumstances of the interrogation, and
. the particular characteristics of the accused must be exanlined. Generally, no
one factor is dispositive. '" ld at 503,
610 A.2d at 786 (quoting D. Nissan et
a!., Law (~r Confessions § 1:9 (1980 &
Cum. Supp. 1991 ». The court also
noted that a claim of involuntariness
which deprived a criminal defendant of
his due process rights cannot stand
"[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession .... " ld at 504,
610 A.2d at 786 (quoting Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986».
Acknowledging that claims of involuntariness may be brought under
either constitutional due process or state
evidentiary law, the court then looked to
common law standards.ld at 504,610
A.2d at 786. The court of appeals
detennined that the common law approach required a more precise examination of the conduct leading up to a
confession. ld. The court listed factors
such as actual or threatened physical
harm, promises not to prosecute, and
promises ofleniency as possible indications of an invalid confession. Id. (citing W. LaFave and J. Israel, 1 Criminal
Procedure §6.2, at 440 (1984». Notwithstanding the difference between the
conunon law approach and the constitutional due process approach, the court
recognized that Maryland common law
looked to the "totality of the circumstances" as well. Reynolds, 327 Md. at
504,610 A.2d at 787.
The court then considered whether
the Assistant State's Attorney improperly induced a confession by instructing
Reynolds to seek counseling.ld at 503,
610 A.2d at 789. Although promises of
leniency which induce defendants to
admit their guilt are often encouraged
by the court, these sanle assurances are
discouraged when made by state agents
during custodial interrogation. ld. at
504,610 A.2d at 787. Thus, any such
inducement on the Assistant State's
Attorney's behalf would be disfavored
by the court. The court found that the
remarks did not promise a benefit or
advantage to Reynolds in exchange for
a confession, but actually served as a
warning that Reynolds might be found
criminally liable.ld at 510, 610 A.2d
at 789. In addition, the court determined that even ifit found that Reynolds
was improperly induced to seek counseling, no evidence existed to support a
finding that he was encouraged to speak
to the police. ld. at 511, 610 A.2d at
790. As such, the court found that under
the totality of the circumstances there
was no inducement. ld;.
The court then addressed the issue
of whether Norman's statements, re-

garding the mental health of Reynolds'
daughter, were improper inducements.
Reynolds' principle argument stemmed
from Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155,423
A.2d 552 (1980), wherein the Court of
Appeals of Maryland invalidated a
defendant's statements because he was
promised that his wife would not be
arrested and charged if he confessed.
Reynold~, 327 Md. at 512,610 A.2d at
790 (citing Stokes at 157,423 A.2d at
553). As the court declared in Stokes,
however, "[n]either Maryland nor any
other jurisdiction ofwhich we are aware
goes so far as to say that a confession
motivated by a defendant's sense of
altruism, without inducement of an official threat or promise, is involuntary."
Reynolds, 327 Md. at 512,610 A.2d at
790 (quoting Stokes at 162,423 A .2d at
555).

Comparing Stokes to the instant the limits of inadmissible testimony in
case, the court distinguished its deci- Maryland courts. By defining with
sion by the fact that Stokes involved greater precision what constitutes an
both a direct and a collateral benefit by improper inducement of a confession,
which the defendant and a third party the cou rt has settled the issue of whether
would benefit from the defendant's con- an improper inducement is present where
fession. Reynolds, 327 Md. at512, 610 no direct personal legal benefit is gained
A.2d at 790. In Reynolds, however, the through a defendant's confession. In
cou rt found that the defendant's confes- addition, Reynolds signifies a trend
sion, which was given with no promise which moves away from a per se excluof legal advantage to the defendant or a sion of testimony and toward an analythird party, was merely an altruistic sis of the totality of the circumstances.
action on defendant's behalf.ld. at513, Rather than focusing on specific state610 A.2d at 791. Accordingly, the court ments made to the defendant, this trend
held that absent any promise or threat increases the importance of detem1inby the police, the mere fact that a crimi- ing the impact of promises made to
nal defendant believes his testimony criminal defendants during interrogawill help a relative will not invalidate tion.
the statements. ld.
Reynolds represents a tightening of
-Michael D. Snyder
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